Juxtaposing the private papers of Louis Mountbatten and Claude Auchinleck, this article seeks to illuminate the crux at the centre of the reconstitution of the British Indian army into Indian and Pakistani armies, namely, their worsening relationship between April and November 1947, in view of what they saw as each other's partisan position and its consequences, the closure of Auchinleck's office and his departure from India. In doing so in considerable detail, it brings to fore yet another aspect of that fraught period of transition at the end of which the British Indian Empire was transformed into the dominions of India and Pakistan and showcases the peculiar predilections in which the British found themselves during the process of transfer of power.
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Since the late-1980s, studies of 1947 rightly became 'regional' and then from 1990s, devoted to the tragic 'human dimension' of partition, they further moved beyond all-India characters and concerns.1 4F 15 In the last decade, the broader, over-arching narrative approach has made a return among studies of partition and its long afterlife in South Asia.1 5F 16 However, the heart of these events, which eclipsed early India-Pakistan relations, was a breakdown of the colonial apparatus, in transition to serve its post-colonial successors. Even as the process of partitioning assets and the army was far from complete, a vortex of war-like mobilisation had begun in Kashmir, Punjab and Kathiawar. While the nationalists on both sides were engaged in the latter, it was men like Mountbatten and Auchinleck, who were presiding over the former; a process that was at the heart of the successful, if bloody, end of empire and 
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and both Dundas and Singh reminded the cabinet that 'when these troops are withdrawn, they will have to be demobilised and some 82, 540 men will be thrown out of employment'.
Auchinleck hoped that the army would remain united and shared his fears otherwise with the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in London: There is no evidence to show that, after April 25, the C-in-C was consulted again as to policy... This is not to be construed as a deliberate affront…it was the expression of an extraordinary and unprecedented revolution in fundamental attitudes on the part of the Viceroy. Baldev Singh had written to Attlee that it was 'imperative that Auchinleck remains for 2-3 years given his good service, popularity with all ranks, invaluable experience, full faith in reorganisation from 2 ½ million men to 400, 000-500, 000'. The mere fact that the Supreme Commander will be in administrative control for a limited period does not mean that he will be free to carry out his own ideas. What we have in mind is that he would endeavour…that the transition from the joint administration to our own administration would be smooth and as nearly in accord as possible with our own ideas regarding the future. If this is not clearly understood there is bound to be a conflict. In a way, the Supreme Commander will have the casting vote in the future Joint Defence Council, and if his general outlook is completely different from our own then clearly the Council will not function at all. Dundas also informed the Council that details as regards the number of British officers required by Pakistan were being worked out and would be available in early October.
Mountbatten wanted the two dominions to make a public announcement of terms and conditions, which they were prepared to offer to British officers willing to serve and hoped Ismay's comment was only slightly more ambiguous:
Are we going to treat both dominions in precisely the same way or are we going to treat any request from either of them on their strict merits? It seems fantastic that Pakistan should be prevented from having any assistance merely because India does not require that particular form of assistance. Indeed, it would be only too easy for India to prevent Pakistan having anything at all by saying -"you must not favour them at our expense".8 8 F
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While all this was going on in London, India and Pakistan were coming closer to hostilities in At the slightest sign of war, I shall threaten to remove all the officers and if war breaks out, I shall actually do so. Your loyalty is to the HMG through me and not your dominions governments.9 2 F
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Mountbatten was informed of this by Bucher, who, having been informed thus by Lockhart, was worried at this example of Auchinleck taking a hand between India and Pakistan.
Mountbatten knew very well that Pakistan would certainly object to the early closing down of the Supreme Headquarters since they, naturally, regarded Auchinleck's office as the only means of getting their 'pound of flesh' out of India. But now, as the Governor-General of India, he was also beginning to argue that it would take up to two years to get Pakistan's stores moved and a month more or less of Auchinleck in India could not make much difference. In any case, the Nehru government was formally pledged to transfer one-third of the stores to Pakistan given the necessary financial adjustments and Mountbatten was confident that Pakistan would get its share unless, of course, 'the situation deteriorates even more', which was an ever-present threat in the autumn and winter of 1947.
By the end of the first week of October, the positions of each of the main protagonists were clear: to Auchinleck, 30 November was alright as the cut-off date for the division of Navy and Air Force but, for the 'reconstitution' of Army, with the British officer's contract expiring only on 31 December that was the more suitable date. Moreover, he was convinced that he was the only officer in India that the British officers and the Pakistan government trusted, and nobody could take his place since 'he would be pushed around' by the Congress. Mountbatten's sentiment was definitely not genuine, but his sense was correct when he wrote to Ismay: 'My heart bled for "Auk", he minds it all so much…'9 4 F 95 -his heart did not bleed for Auchinleck, but the latter definitely minded it all very much. 111 When they did, they complained that many of the difficulties, which they had met in the course of the negotiations had been due to the fact that 
